‘See No Evil, Hear No Evil’
An Exploration of Radicalization in Canada’s Aboriginal Communities
By Thomas D Marshall
In the post-9/11 era it is easy to forget that Canada’s democracy has problems. Salafi Jihad, or the Long War against international terrorism grab nearly every headline of our provincial and national press – and in the ‘dog-eat-dog’ world of newsprint, you give the people what they want – the comfort that the struggle is out there, not here. And to be sure this coverage no doubt reflects our conception of Canada as a largely peaceful, quiet nation. Yet, Canadians have, in so many ways, come to believe that Canada has fulfilled the greatest promise of western democracy without a hitch. We have come to believe that all Canadians are endowed with the power to affect the circumstances of our lot in a meaningful and peaceful way. To be sure, for most people, to a great extent, this is no doubt the reality: That through democratic institutions like representative government we can and often do seek meaningful redress to most grievances, and failing that, we can seek redress through an impartial and rights-protective judicial system. This image however, masks the burdensome reality that even within this flagship of a First-world nation there are those who no longer believe in the promise of western democracy. There are those who feel collectively alienated, ridiculed, and politically impotent by a system that fails to represent them. They are tired of fighting for rights in courtrooms where little is resolved, and much is lost. These few want radical change, by whatever means necessary. That is a problem.
This reality is most markedly the case for Canada’s least well off group, its Aboriginal communities. The reasons for this are many. Colonization, attempted assimilation and inaction on the part of the Canadian Government have left deep wounds that have served to separate mainstream Canadian society from Aboriginal peoples. They have become a minority in their own land and fit oddly into, and seem out of place in, Canada’s Eurocentric modernity.
Such situations are, of course, not conducive to peace and stability on the homefront. Anyone who remembers the Oka crisis of 1990 knows that if these domestic problems are not dealt with in a timely and fair manner the potential for disaster exists. But, more recent events and trends suggest that it is not simply violence that Canada should take caution against, but also the changing ideological and philosophical movements that are taking hold in Canadian Aboriginal communities: The radicalization of thought, which precedes action. Writers like Taiaiake Alfred express the essence of this change perfectly. He states, for example, that “conventional and acceptable approaches to making change are leading us nowhere.” (Emphasis Added) Alfred, a member of the Mohawk Nation, is one of many suggesting “intensive and profound resurgence…not moderation…[and] grounded defiance…agitation…[and the] development of a collective capacity for self-defence.” The resurgence of ‘Red Power’ and Warrior movements and steady rise in the sometimes-violent confrontations between Aboriginal communities over the past 40 years will eventually turn Government attention to domestic potentials for radicalization. It must.
Radicalization then, so common in the far-flung corners of the globe, should not distract Canadians from its potential to become a problem here. ‘We’ have collectively forgotten that radicalization is a process not confined to any particular place. It is not the sole province of Islam, or the product of psychopathic logic, but a response to real stimuli that can be fostered through both poor foreign and domestic policy decisions alike. As Edward Muller rightly suggests, “people who take part in acts of civil disobedience or political violence are discontented about something. That is a truism.”
This paper will therefore attempt to address this developing Canadian situation and make the argument that the time for neglecting the rise of radicalism in Aboriginal communities has past. This will be accomplished through the amalgamation of different knowledge bases that will help illustrate this thesis. Firstly, this paper will delve selectively into the historical legacy of interactions between Aboriginal communities and the Canadian government to illustrate the progenitors of underlying frustrations nascent in aboriginal communities. In line with this, this paper will then outline how Canada’s Aboriginal population fairs today, as a result of this historical legacy. Secondly, it will focus on the rise of Aboriginal political and legal confrontation since the 1960’s and explore how Political Science theories of radicalization can help us understand these now shifting tactics. Specifically, this paper will look into Depravation and Alienation Theories in order to show how these events have helped change the character of Native struggle away from one merely for civic inclusion and recognition. In the third and concluding section, this paper will highlight some of the problems of inaction and suggest alternative courses for resolution. The essay will conclude that if left lingering and unresolved, the Aboriginal struggle has the potential to develop into a full blown radical movement, where confrontation, and more violent episodes are likely to occur. We have, it will be shown, reached the tipping point.
1) “The Noble Savage”
(This paper begins with a selective recount of Canada’s history of Native-European dealings. The hope is to convey to the reader a sense of the injustice suffered by Canada’s Natives over the past four centuries. Though this is a well-worn method for exploring the ‘Aboriginal Question’ it is still the best route to understand the genesis of our current difficulties. For, as Margaret Atwood recently stated, “when you lose your narrative, you become lost, stuck in the present, disconnected… Memory is everything.”)
1.1) History: “Our Complete Humanity”
By the mid 19th century Natives in Canada had, to put it bluntly, outlived their usefulness. They were no longer needed in the ‘earthy’ fur trade or as ‘allies’ against other nations as a rapidly industrializing post-Victorian society took shape. As Michael Ignatieff suggests, “As soon as…settlers…expanded to sufficient size to compete effectively with aboriginal tribes, the settlers claimed exclusive titles to land, ignored treaty agreements, and pushed Native(s) into the hinterlands.” Indeed, by the mid 19th century Aboriginals could find few reflections of their traditional lives in anything that now surrounded them.
As Dickenson states in her book, Canada’s First Nations, “the imperial civil administration (of the 1850’s) for British North America was dominated by two ideas concerning Amerindians: that as a people they were disappearing, and that those who remained should be either removed to communities isolated from Euro-Canadians or else assimilated.” (Emphasis added) As ‘good Christians’ it was further thought that there was incumbent upon Europeans a duty to ‘civilize’ and ‘protect’ this “helpless race”. As ‘targets of an official assimilation policy’ natives would soon be forced into a state-managed regime bent on displacing, and then replacing, their culture and history.
In 1876 the first Indian Act was passed by the then newly formed Canadian Government as a means of centralizing control over Canada’s Native population. The Act was meant to “encourage the gradual civilization of the Indian Tribes in the Canadas…(and)…gradually remove all legal distinctions between (Indians) and Her Majesty’s other Canadian Subjects.” Through the Act, Native people would receive a registration number and be assigned to a ‘Band’ and reserve. The Band Council of each reserve would be uniform and councilors would be chosen by way of election – thus hastening the extinction of their tribal and inherent (and therefore uncivilized) systems of governance. The reserve lands themselves would remain under Crown control so that it could be occupied but never really owned by the Band or individual Native inhabitants.
These initial measures however soon developed into a full frontal assault on all-things Native. For example, the Aboriginal tradition of the Potlatch, a yearly event where Natives would exchange their possessions, was banned as “inimical to the concept of private property.” Totem Poles were similarly found to be opposed to Christian civilized values. Sun Dances - equally viewed as ‘uncivilized - soon too became prohibited activities.
By the turn of the last century Natives had become the most highly regulated people on the continent under a regime in which their input had not even been sought. To illustrate the repressiveness of this racist regulation one need not look very far. No Native could leverage capital, for example, against fixed assets because Natives were effectively banned from owning reserve lands. Passes were required of Natives who wished to venture off their reserve or even to visit another. This had the dual effect of stifling grassroots movements amongst Aboriginals and of hindering parents from visiting their offspring in off-reserve residential schools. Residential schools too, are an interesting phenomena (with which Canada has only recently come to terms). These schools were to be places of learning for Native children, away from the ‘backward’ cultures and languages of their extended families: They were in reality centers for abuse at the hands of state and church officials and places designed to alienate a new generation from their cultural lineage. And perhaps worst of all, from a legal and social justice perspective, Natives who wished to challenge the legality of their subjugation under this foreign regime, or challenge the abhorrent conditions in which they were forced to live, were barred from raising funds - to hire a lawyer for example - to aid in their defense. (This policy, initially implemented in 1927, was not repealed until 1951.)
By the turn of the 20th century the regulation of every aspect of Aboriginal life was complete, even if it had not ‘fully’ achieved its twin goals of isolation and assimilation. Many blamed the regime itself for failing to do either well. Others, of course, blamed the Aboriginals. Nonetheless, the comprehensive mishmash of rules, systems, political regimes, passes, bans, and ‘re-education’ (and resettlement) had indeed led Canada’s Aboriginals to the edge of society. The decision to “establish reserves with the aim of civilizing” these now largely landless and degraded peoples, as a “prelude to integration”, had largely failed to do the latter at all. Marginalized, destitute, and de-cultured, it is little wonder that these once proud masters of this entire continent now found themselves alienated, ridiculed, and politically impotent.
1.2)‘The trail of Tears:’
Canada’s First Nations Today
(I have chosen only to focus here on Reserves, Health and Education with good reason. While there are several issues in which the current disparity might be illustrated adequately, outlining ‘where one lives,’ ‘how one lives’, and how effectively one is ‘tooled in life’ encapsulates, I believe, the key progenitors of political unrest.)
Reserves:
The legacy of European colonization is plain to see for anyone who has ever visited a reserve. Almost without exception, they are islands of overt poverty in a sea of relative wealth. As Professor Morse of the University of Ottawa suggests, “the poverty and despair that grips…First Nations in Canada…is blatant, tragic, and depressingly (too) well documented.” (Emphasis Added)
One of the reasons for this is that reserve Aboriginals now inhabit (they most often do not own the land) a mere 0.48% of Canada’s total land mass. Often this renders persons living on such reserves a great “distance from markets and population centres…leaving the vast majority of First Nations in which the standard engines of economic self-sufficiency…are simply not viable.” Many of these reserves are also sparsely populated, with over half of Canada’s total reserve population inhabiting communities of less than one thousand persons. In 1990 the percentage of registered Aboriginals on social assistance was 42%; that is over two hundred times the overall Canadian average. In some reserve communities, employment is as low as a mere 10% - that is – 90% do not, or cannot find work.
Health:
Aboriginals are more often sick than other Canadians. On reserve Natives are six times as likely to develop Tuberculosis when compared to the overall Canadian population. Sexually transmitted diseases are ten times the Canadian average, while suicides are three times the national rate. Infant mortality, overall mortality rates, AIDS, Alcohol, Fetal alcohol syndrome, (SIDS), and gasoline fume abuse – all these factors plague remote Aboriginal communities at many times the rate of Canada’s population as a whole. To make matters worse still, almost all of these factors are not ‘diseases’ but symptoms of systemic failures in providing quality healthcare and preventing the social degradation and malaise that fosters such things as alcohol abuse and high suicide rates. Many of these ‘symptoms’ are, as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples suggested, an expression of “collective anguish” through which “a significant number of the Aboriginal people of this country [have come to] believe they have more seasons to die than to live.”
Education:
In education too, there continues to be great disparity. For example, fewer qualified teachers are available in outlying reserve communities, when compared to cosmopolitan areas. Many are also not representative of the Native children they teach. This leaves students in larger classrooms where frustration and disinterest in school are rife. Curriculum is another on-going problem. As Pauline Comeau suggests, “bureaucrats decide that an education program designed for a student in Toronto [is] adequate for an Indian child” in remote parts of the province. Given these facts however, it is not surprising then to find that nearly 40% of registered Natives have finished only grade nine (or below) as compared to just over 10% for non-Aboriginals. And while almost 15% of non-Aboriginals have completed university training, “only 3% of Indians…receive university degrees.”
2) Radicalization as a Process
The question, no doubt, that everyone should be asking at this point is; how does all this lead ideological radicalization? Or, how does this lead to Oka - or to calls for “radical Change” and an end to co-optation? How do we go from discussing reserves and healthcare policy to a current discussion of grassroots radical movements with unknown aims? It is true that many factors can contribute to the spawning of such things – and yet, the same factors at another time, or another place, might lead to nothing. How is one to know whether what we are dealing with is a lamb, or a wolf? This is, of course, the crux of the problem: Predicting where the ‘perfect storm’ will erupt, and where it will merely blow by.
At this point in our discussion, we now have a basic understanding of the frustrations that still plague Native communities. These are, as Professor Morse suggests, ‘blatant’ and all too well documented. But what this paper is interested in is what has turned this situation into the ‘perfect storm’. What other conditions have arisen in the past 40 years that are crucial, in this place, and at this time, to fomenting radicalism in these communities?
It is suggested here that there are three important factors that can be discerned from recent historical events. Firstly, there is the continuing presence of the underlying frustrations discussed above. Secondly, there have arisen greater expectations, through access to the justice and political systems, for hopes of more civic advancement than is realistic to expect from the dominant society, policies, and institutions. This has in turn led to a cycle of expectation and disappointment which has engendered collective feelings of alienation and contempt for modes of seeking justice through ‘the system.’ And, thirdly, that as a result of the above two factors, Canadians have witnessed over recent years a change in the aims of the Aboriginal struggle from one for civic inclusion and social justice, to one increasingly radical and separatist in its outlook. Since we have already discussed the first factor, this paper will now focus on the remaining two.
2.1) ‘Great Expectations’
(Alex De Tocqueville once stated that “it is not always when things are going from bad to worse that revolution breaks out.” For him, experience taught that the most ‘perilous’ moment was when a government sought to mend its ways. This theory has come to be known in many circles as the “de Tocqueville Paradox.”)
2.2) The Theory
Before discussing what has occurred “on the ground” over the past 40 years to both raise and crash Native expectations repeatedly, it is best to first outline why this investigation is important at all. Many political science ‘buffs’ are no doubt well aware of the “J-Curve” and other such similar theories, but the basic tenets and rationale are worth repeating – if only to highlight the past’s relevance to radicalization today and provide a theoretical framework through which we can better understand current trends.
In the wake of the 1960’s social upheaval there arose in the political science field a need to explain such phenomena. One theory that quickly gained widespread acceptance and variation was ‘Relative Deprivation’ (or similarly named: It has assumed several aliases over the past 40 years). Building on de Tocqueville’s ‘Paradox’ this theory stated that people revolt when their expectations exceed their achievements – or in other words – when one’s expectations are elevated but cannot be met. This theory hypothesized that people who undergo such events, experience ‘systemic frustration’ when an ‘intolerable gap’ exists between what they believe is deserved, and what actually results. Redress for the apparent ‘intolerable’ discrepancy is then channeled through political upheaval – both violent and non-violent.
In the 1970’s this basic theoretical perspective underwent many changes with some questioning whether other factors might be more relevant to determining the likelihood for radicalization or political violence. In 1973 Bernard Grofman, after looking over nearly a decade of research and study in relation to the J-Curve, proposed that what was more important than one sheer drop in expectation (the J-Curve) was the presence of persistent peaks and troughs in expectation and gratification (a V-Curve). This tugging back and forth of people’s hopes (in the present) produced, his experiments told him, greater frustrations than one single drop.
A short while later the J-curve again underwent minor surgery through the influential work of Abraham Miller. In his study of the J-Curve and the Black urban riots of the previous decade Miller added to Grofman’s findings by highlighting the importance of prolonged “extreme fluctuation and ambiguity” of expectations in affected communities. Radical fluctuations, he found, engender “stress” which leads to “frustration” which in turn leads to “aggression”.
Six years after Miller, Edward Muller proposed yet another twist to the J-Curve saga – each theorist building on the work of the previous. His research, in part, rejected much of the dogma of the previous twenty years in Relative Deprivation Theory. Instead of peaks and troughs, or sheer drops, Muller suggested that what was in fact happening was relatively simple – people who radicalized simply felt alienated. (This hypothesis, in many ways, confirmed Both Miller and Grofman’s proviso’s to the original J-Curve theory.) As he stated, “alienation stands out among all the explanatory variables as the strongest correlate of aggressive Political Participation across the general Public…” What Muller meant by alienation however, was not simply disinterest or individual-specific disaffection, but rather diffuse collective alienation – a clear perception of a lack of “trustworthiness, competence, and integrity (and unresponsiveness) [on the part of] political authorities.”
2.3) The J-Curve and Aboriginal Radicalization
When we amalgamate the above theories of radicalization into one overarching framework then, we find that the process for radicalization can be, at certain times, and at certain places, relatively simple: People will, when ‘conventional and acceptable’ approaches to making change lead nowhere, embark upon…radical step[s].” The question, indeed, then becomes: does this apply to the Aboriginals of Canada? To a selective look at this we now turn.
2.4) Peaks, Troughs and their Results: The Aboriginal Context
The challenge in this section is not to simply illustrate to the reader that the path towards the radicalization of thought follows a logical and perceptible trajectory (though no doubt that is also an important aspect of this paper) but to also demonstrate how, in the broader context, Government and Court decisions and Royal Commissions have helped foster this shift in thinking. It is submitted that it has been the singular failure of both the Courts and Government of Canada to live up to its commitments, to achieve what it promises, that has led us to the result that some feel alternatives to acceptable modes of redress are necessary.
Peaks:
It is relatively easy to find collective ‘peaks’ (in expectations for civic inclusion) with correlative troughs within the contemporary Aboriginal community. In fact, though it reads as somewhat of a laundry list, these events highlight the tempo and current that has driven legitimate expectation and fostered concurrent disillusionment. We might, for example, conveniently begin with the 1951 groundbreaking removal of restrictions for raising funds for pressing Native causes against the federal government. Natives in Canada became enfranchised federally shortly after, in 1960, thus giving them a truly democratic voice in the branch of government responsible for their affairs. The 1966 Hawthorn Report, A Survey of Contemporary Indians in Canada, suggested that more was needed from the Federal Government in areas such as education and health, while less emphasis was needed on assimilation. It suggested that Indians be regarded as ‘Citizens-plus’ – that is a “group with rights beyond other Canadians” due to their status as original inhabitants. Throughout the years 1968 and 1969 Canada’s Federal Government conducted widespread consultations with Native leaders across Canada for input on proposed changes to the Indian Act. For many Aboriginals, these consultations were the “first time a minister had ever sat and talked with them”. In 1970, Aboriginal groups, (many of which had been the product of the consultative grassroots forums for the 1969 proposal) succeeded in forcing the Canadian Government to abandon a 1969 Whitepaper that urged the government to do away with the Indian Act. Some of these groups, “grounded in the philosophy and tactics of the American rights movement,” became increasingly empowered, and staged sit-ins and rallies and even, briefly, armed resistance against Quebec Police at Kahnawake in 1973. Aboriginal title to land was that same year recognized in Calder as a legal right derived not from European law, but from the fact of prior occupation. This helped pave the way for Aboriginal land claims based not on legal doctrine, but on proof of historical occupation. In 1982, Aboriginal groups such as the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB) succeeded in forcing into the Canadian constitution a provision recognizing ‘existing’ aboriginal treaty rights. In line with this victory, Prime Minister Trudeau also offered “Native peoples inclusion in a series of First Ministers Conferences (FMC’s)…” in which, some years later, the provinces and Prime Minister of Canada signaled their willingness to recognize the inherent right of Natives Self-Government. In 1990, the Sparrow case purported to restrict governmental infringements of Native land rights to “compelling and substantial” legislative objectives. This, it contended, would protect Native lands from illegitimate infringements and promote Aboriginal control over reserve lands. In 1996 the epic, and long-awaited Royal Commission on Aboriginal Affairs (RCAP) submitted its findings and recommendations – among them the recommendation that there be created an Aboriginal parliament as Canada’s third level of government. The RCAP also suggested such things as the redistribution of massive swaths of Canada’s land-base. This would, it was thought, facilitate Aboriginal economic self-sufficiency. Then, in the 1997 case of Delgamuukw Canada’s Supreme Court once again further refined its conception of Aboriginal title and noted the encompassed right to exclusive use and occupation of reserve lands. In 2000 the Canadian government ratified the Nisga’a Land Claims Agreement that led to the creation of a municipal-style government for the Nisga’a – it was the first such land claims agreement in British Columbia. The agreement included self-governing control over 1,900 square kilometers and delivered nearly 200 million dollars in compensation for the Nisga’a. It further devolved signifacant powers to the local Aboriginal government over local many matters.
Through the above selection of monumental historical events and decisions one is left with little wonder that expectations run high. Through this well-groomed ‘spin’ of understanding, it appears that Aboriginals in Canada are enfranchised “citizens-plus” who have constitutionally protected rights and judicially recognized claims to potentially vast swaths of Canada’s landscape. This view is backed by a legion of Royal Commissions that suggest that a fundamental restructuring of Canada’s political and governmental structure is imminent and needed. And Government officials confidently point to successes like the Nisga’a (or James Bay, or Nunavut) that its recognition of the inherent right of self-government is indeed translating into concrete results. (This, of course, is the image many Canadians like to project; it is theangelic image that we see in our reflection. But there can be no mistake about it – it is mere illusion, and many know it.)
Troughs:
Without more detail, it might simply be stated here that one of the greatest ‘troughs’ experienced by Natives (despite what appears to be the case above) is the tenacity of the Status Quo. As Michael Ignatieff suggests, many are “making a good living out of rights talk. But, are things getting better in Davis Inlet and Burnt Church?” The facts expressed in this paper in section 1.2 also speak volumes in favour of this conclusion - but the unapologetic resilience of the status quo plays itself out through concrete examples as well as in the abstract. For example, in regards to self-government, much remains the same today as it was 40 years ago. The right of self-government, fostered in the Proclamation of 1763, and affirmed in constitutional talks by all levels of government during the 1990’s, has yet to become widely implemented. The “tiny percentage” of traditional lands now under a municipal-style form of self-government, such as is exercised in through the Nisga’a land claims agreement, should hardly be considered a victory for the forces of change. Royal Commissions similarly lay plain the stunning rein of the status quo. For example, the 1966 Hawthorn Report, the 1983 Penner Report, and the nearly 4000 page 1996 RCAP report all say essentially the same thing: “the notion of integration and assimilation [are] not reasonable avenues to pursue” – “that Indian First Nations…[should] be recognized and treated as equal to the provinces in all respects” – and that “Aboriginal Peoples…are unique and…have a right to governmental autonomy.”
But if the politicians seem bad, it is worse when Natives seek redress from courts only to find their rights pontificated away. For example, though Delgamuukw helped refine the legal meaning of Aboriginal title, the case also largely destroyed the gains made in other cases like Sparrow. In Sparrow the court appeared to narrow the range of justifications governments could use in seeking to infringe Native title. But in Delgamuukw, Lamer C.J.C. wrote:
“In the wake of Gladstone, the range of legislative objectives that can justify the infringement of aboriginal title is fairly broad…In my opinion, the development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered species, the building of infrastructure and settlement of foreign populations to support those aims…(among more would justify infringement).” (Emphasis added)
Given the Chef Justice’s ‘opinion’ it did not take long for this single Aboriginal victory to turn into a resounding, and far-reaching, defeat for the long-term protection of Aboriginal rights.
2.5) The Results
The result of these peaks and troughs is that today Canada’s Aboriginal communities are a “tinderbox.” These communities have become “politicized and politically-conscious” through the process of raising (and real) expectations - and yet remain places in which its members feel politically “muted” because of a lack of “genuine redress”. This is a dangerous mix - one where the democratic political institutions that normally provide “opportunities for citizens to bring about peaceful change” are viewed as largely blocked. This view has, as suggested through the J-curve analysis , propelled many Native elites to shift tactics, “from articulating grievances to pursuing an organized…political battle…[which will] overthrow [their] unlivable existence [in favour of] decolonization.” It has, in other words, propelled many disaffected Aboriginals to seek alternatives because of the perceived failings of institutions and “legalist strategies.” This has in turn led to an increase in the prevalence of, and belief in the viability of, Aboriginal protests that fall outside the normal and widely accepted routes for redressing grievances. In this area the work of Howard Ramos is particularly interesting; his survey of the rates of Aboriginal protest incidents over the past 40 years confirms that “the first dramatic increase in the number of Aboriginal protests…occurs in the late 1960’s…followed by an explosion of contention in 1989 and then again in 1990…” Aboriginals are increasingly resorting to occupations, blockades, and other acts of civil disobedience because, as suggested by the J-Curve, Government and Court decisions and Royal Commissions have unwittingly helped foster this shift in thinking by failing to live up to what it promises to deliver. Indeed, this is the result: “After…years of federal inaction…Canada is at a crossroads between co-operation and conflict.”
Conclusions
Alex de Tocqueville was exactly right in his observations about the causes of the French Revolution. His suggested that the “most perilous moment for a bad government is when it seeks to mend its ways” - when it seeks to extend, piece by piece, to previously disenfranchised members, a voice and stake in the continuity of the ‘old regime.’ It no doubt becomes a high-stakes game when government promises to do this because what is often at risk is the greatest promise of liberal democracy: That all of us be endowed with the power to affect the circumstances of our lot. That through democratic institutions like representative government we might seek peaceful redress, and, failing that, that we might alternatively find redress through the courts: That impartial body which is charged with the duty of shielding us from injustice and capable of striking down those who would seek to dispossess us of our power.
If this paper is correct that the fulfillment of this promise has largely been denied, and if Tocqueville is right, then it is both easier to understand the problem, and yet more difficult to find a solution to the ‘Aboriginal question.’ According to this ‘de Tocquevillian paradox’ Canada now finds itself in the position of having extended this lofty promise to many who no longer believe in its worth. Does this mean then that Canada has surpassed the ‘tipping point’ and waded into the unchartered and dangerous waters the J-Curve suggests exists on the other side of the ‘intolerable gap’? That is more difficult to predict. While maintaining the status quo will undoubtedly “result in [a] faster deterioration of the overall situation of Aboriginal people and relations between them and other citizens” there are hopeful signs that it is still not too late. Even many Aboriginal leaders and elite advocating radical change still refrain from legitimizing violence as a means to an end. Indeed, more often than not the question left unanswered is not why Aboriginals protest, but why they remain largely committed to non-violent peaceful means of resistance. As Richard Powless tells us, “terrorism has always been an option for First Nations…we do not have much political power…[but] we haven’t chosen that option. Of course, the answer to that question may be succinctly captured in the comments of Chief Justice Lamer: “Let's face it, we're all here to stay.”
But, if Chief Justice Lamer is right, and getting along seems the only answer, it is clear from the above that Canada has much to learn. One great part of the problem is, clearly, that Canada has failed to understand the ‘Native problem’ from the viewpoint of Aboriginals. Overwhelmingly, Canada’s government has signaled through its words, and at times through its actions, a desire to include Aboriginals in sharing the fruits of this democratic nation. But if belonging means being understood, sharing a common and linked memory, and having a stake in this not-so ancient regime, Canada must be prepared to implement its promises in full. It is the presupposition of belonging that we all share some sense of ‘common condition’ but Canada can hardly admit to this when there remain those who feel legitimately alienated, ridiculed, and politically impotent.
This situation is, of course, not conducive to peace and stability. That is why the ‘road’ has been so bumpy thus far. The resurgence of Red Power and Warrior movements and the steady rise in confrontations between Aboriginal communities over the past 40 years will eventually turn Government attention to domestic potentials for radicalization, but it should not be wait until we have crossed this Rubicon and cannot turn back. The J-Curve suggests that the relationship between expectations and reality is real and perceptible, and we ignore this at our own peril. That is why radicalization, which is so common in the far-flung corners of the globe, should not be distracting Canadians from its potential to become a problem here. ‘We’ have collectively forgotten that radicalization is a process not confined to any particular place. It is not the sole province of Islam, or the product of psychopathic logic, but a response to real stimuli that can be fostered through both poor foreign and domestic policy decisions alike. It is time to act now, before it becomes too late.
