The bottom line doesn’t justify government regulation of our private selves
To the extent that the writer of the article entitled “Healthy choices and John Stuart Mill,” (Comment page, Jan. 24) was encouraging Canadians to become more healthful, one can hardly find fault with his opinion. Good health is a laudable goal, no doubt.
But there is something deeply wrong with the balance of this writer’s thesis, which suggests nothing less than the total disintegration of any discernible boundary between our public and private selves. Of this, I believe, something should be said.
The idea this writer promotes — that the public administration of societal goods warrants government regulation of the details of our lives, so long as our life choices have “prejudicial” fiscal impacts on “the system” — is at the very least, a very bad one. Even he could not help but point out a couple of the systemic reasons why we, as a society, might balk at (for instance) taxing people with high blood pressure.
But his reasons (he cited bureaucratic bloat and cost) were largely unimaginative and failed to adequately capture what I think is the core reason why most Canadians would, upon reflection, reject his thesis.
I will start with an uncontroversial claim: Each of us inhabits both a public and private sphere.
If I am brushing my teeth I am likely to say, in that instant, that I inhabit the private sphere of my life as an individual only. No one is watching me, nor would I expect or want someone to be. I am a citizen in that instant too, of course, but the defining characteristics and obligations associated with that role, (as a citizen), I am apt to think, will play little part in how I go about the task.
Conversely, if I am a member of a jury, I am likely to admit, in that instant, I inhabit the public sphere of my life. In that role, the responsibilities and duties I bear as a citizen will determine, in large part, the choices open to me. It would be improper — and it would be an abdication of my duties — to choose to brush my teeth during the trial, for example.
How we define this boundary between our public and private selves — and the corresponding obligations and freedoms these roles necessarily entail — is, therefore, of vital importance in determining what we owe and what we are due. But upon what principles do we determine one thing to be public and the other private?
If the writer’s thesis were left to stand, our public responsibilities and private freedoms would be determined by the quotient of “fiscal impact.” As he would have it, if “my life choices end up costing the community” money, then these choices — be they about my body or the things I might put into my body — are fit for public regulation. This, I think, is an unacceptable way of distinguishing the public from the private.
In part, it is unacceptable because it is under-inclusive. The quotient of “fiscal impact” does not, in any meaningful way, capture the myriad of reasons we are likely to cite in support of a just division between our public and private spheres.
When one chooses, for example, to become vegetarian or to start taking the stairs, one is unlikely to see these decisions as being informed by considerations of the fiscal impacts or benefits that might accrue to society. Rather, one is likely to view these decisions, and one’s ability to choose for ones’ self, as matters of personal autonomy and individuality.
Thus, respecting the autonomy and individuality of others — as a correlative to the claim each of us makes for ourselves — is at the core of our deliberations when determining the proper division between our public and private selves. This core aspect, however, is lost when we give primacy to the quotient of fiscal impact.
It is tempting, of course, to view our obligations in purely economic terms. It makes determining what we owe each other — and what we are due — as easy as pulling out a calculator.
But to do so is to obscure, and diminish, what it means to be fully human. Our fellow citizens are not simply debits and credits — they are individuals deserving of respect. And to respect anything less — the taxpayer or the bottom line only, for example — is to fail to pay heed to what really matters: our humanity.
T. David Marshall is a lawyer practising in Hamilton
But there is something deeply wrong with the balance of this writer’s thesis, which suggests nothing less than the total disintegration of any discernible boundary between our public and private selves. Of this, I believe, something should be said.
The idea this writer promotes — that the public administration of societal goods warrants government regulation of the details of our lives, so long as our life choices have “prejudicial” fiscal impacts on “the system” — is at the very least, a very bad one. Even he could not help but point out a couple of the systemic reasons why we, as a society, might balk at (for instance) taxing people with high blood pressure.
But his reasons (he cited bureaucratic bloat and cost) were largely unimaginative and failed to adequately capture what I think is the core reason why most Canadians would, upon reflection, reject his thesis.
I will start with an uncontroversial claim: Each of us inhabits both a public and private sphere.
If I am brushing my teeth I am likely to say, in that instant, that I inhabit the private sphere of my life as an individual only. No one is watching me, nor would I expect or want someone to be. I am a citizen in that instant too, of course, but the defining characteristics and obligations associated with that role, (as a citizen), I am apt to think, will play little part in how I go about the task.
Conversely, if I am a member of a jury, I am likely to admit, in that instant, I inhabit the public sphere of my life. In that role, the responsibilities and duties I bear as a citizen will determine, in large part, the choices open to me. It would be improper — and it would be an abdication of my duties — to choose to brush my teeth during the trial, for example.
How we define this boundary between our public and private selves — and the corresponding obligations and freedoms these roles necessarily entail — is, therefore, of vital importance in determining what we owe and what we are due. But upon what principles do we determine one thing to be public and the other private?
If the writer’s thesis were left to stand, our public responsibilities and private freedoms would be determined by the quotient of “fiscal impact.” As he would have it, if “my life choices end up costing the community” money, then these choices — be they about my body or the things I might put into my body — are fit for public regulation. This, I think, is an unacceptable way of distinguishing the public from the private.
In part, it is unacceptable because it is under-inclusive. The quotient of “fiscal impact” does not, in any meaningful way, capture the myriad of reasons we are likely to cite in support of a just division between our public and private spheres.
When one chooses, for example, to become vegetarian or to start taking the stairs, one is unlikely to see these decisions as being informed by considerations of the fiscal impacts or benefits that might accrue to society. Rather, one is likely to view these decisions, and one’s ability to choose for ones’ self, as matters of personal autonomy and individuality.
Thus, respecting the autonomy and individuality of others — as a correlative to the claim each of us makes for ourselves — is at the core of our deliberations when determining the proper division between our public and private selves. This core aspect, however, is lost when we give primacy to the quotient of fiscal impact.
It is tempting, of course, to view our obligations in purely economic terms. It makes determining what we owe each other — and what we are due — as easy as pulling out a calculator.
But to do so is to obscure, and diminish, what it means to be fully human. Our fellow citizens are not simply debits and credits — they are individuals deserving of respect. And to respect anything less — the taxpayer or the bottom line only, for example — is to fail to pay heed to what really matters: our humanity.
T. David Marshall is a lawyer practising in Hamilton
http://www.thespec.com/opinion/columns/article/877586---fiscal-impact-vs-individual-autonomy
